

29 July 70

Col. White

Attached is a revised draft of the U-2 paper, which we have rewritten along the lines you suggested and to which we have added the list of specific questions. I have taken the liberty to reword and reorder some of the questions to make them more compatible with the rest of the text but I think the meaning has been preserved. These changes you will easily recognize. Other changes made to the previous draft are underlined in red.

Donald H. Steininger

USAF review(s) completed.

NRO review(s) completed.

JCS review(s) completed.

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29 JUL 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: 40 Committee
SUBJECT: IDEALIST Program

In December 1969, the President approved continuation of the IDEALIST Program through FY 1971 and directed the 40 Committee to review the project again prior to consideration of the FY 1972 budget. To assist in this review, information is provided herein on the current status and capabilities of the program.

The IDEALIST Program

25X1 The CIA IDEALIST Program provides a means of mounting
[] reconnaissance flights by the improved U-2's in
times of crisis or in areas where cloud cover inhibits
satellite coverage. The IDEALIST fleet is postured to
25X1 react rapidly to world-wide contingencies []

[] Its
aircraft have a high expected survivability over China
and most potential crisis areas.

Present IDEALIST operational assets consist of six U-2R aircraft at two permanent bases. One detachment is at Edwards Air Force Base, California, with four aircraft; the other is [REDACTED] with two aircraft. All aircraft are maintained in an operationally ready posture. Both bases have a capability for world-wide deployment and an aircraft can be over its mission target in about 50 hours after alert. The IDEALIST U-2R is also certified for operations from selected U.S. aircraft carriers.

[REDACTED]

An agreement with the [REDACTED] provides for [REDACTED] participation in photographic [REDACTED] collection in areas of mutual concern and for the exchange of appropriate information.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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The following information summarizes the capabilities of specific IDEALIST Program assets:

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a. Photographic Systems: The "H" Camera System can cover an area from 225 to 1370 nm in length. It can be used in vertical or oblique positions. The "H" achieves [redacted] resolution vertical and, standing off from the target, three foot resolution at 25 nm, and, depending on atmospheric conditions, up to eight feet or so at 50 nm. IRIS II system can acquire 2100 to 3600 nm linear coverage, a 60 to 70 nm lateral coverage, and a [redacted] [redacted] vertical resolution.

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c. Aircraft Survivability:

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(2) Thus the survivability of the U-2R flying over mainland China is high. The MiG has little capability against it - as was demonstrated when a Chicom MiG-21 attack was successfully evaded last October - and the known SA-2 sites can be avoided by proper flight planning.

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(3) On the other hand, the survivability of the U-2R is decreased over countries with a dense SAM deployment and drops to about 76 per cent against an aircraft intercept system using Mirage III type fighters equipped with the R-530 CW long-range homing missile and Cyrano radar. Thus, the U-2 is not a feasible vehicle for over-flight of the USSR, the eastern bloc countries, or the

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heavily defended areas of the UAR. At the same time, it is worth noting that recent collection efforts in the Middle East (by satellite) and off the coast of China (by U-2) indicate that valuable information can be obtained by using the oblique capabilities of the "H" Camera without flying over the defended areas.

The Issue

The issue before the Committee is whether this quick-reaction and plausibly deniable surveillance system for foreign areas is worth maintaining as an option for those future contingencies which cannot be accommodated by our satellites, either because they happen not to be in orbit at the right time or because cloud cover inhibits coverage. In making this judgement, the Committee must take note of the fact that there are two other systems which are also available for use for any such contingency; namely, the SR-71, and the Tagboard drone (the subsonic drone is too vulnerable to be considered a competitor except for very select areas.) Although neither the SR-71 or Tagboard could be expected to easily survive the USSR SA-5 environment, they are clear candidates for use in any area for which the U-2 might be considered. Both have some important capabilities which the U-2 does not have:


- Both fly higher and faster than the U-2 and are therefore considerably less vulnerable to any given defensive environment.

- The Tagboard drone may offer less political risk in some situations than an aircraft manned by a U.S. pilot.

On the other hand the U-2 aircraft, whether operated by the CIA or the Air Force, has a unique performance advantage over the Tagboard and SR-71:

- The maneuverability of the U-2 and the characteristics of its sensors gives it an advantage in certain situations, particularly for target arrays of irregular conformation. Also, the flexibility of its payload and its ability to be airborne for long periods allows it to perform special missions such as stand-off photography collection.

In addition to this performance capability, the CIA managed IDEALIST U-2 provides one additional advantage, namely:




One of the questions before the Committee is whether this unique characteristic is sufficiently important to pay the cost necessary to maintain it.

To isolate the various costs involved, the NRO has studied a number of possible combinations of the SAC and CIA fleets, as represented below:

<u>Mode of Operation</u>	<u>Annual Cost</u>	
1. Continue <u>current</u> split fleet operation (fly 12 aircraft, 6 in each fleet)	<div></div>	25X1
2. Continue split fleet <div></div> base (fly 10, 5 in CIA, 5 in SAC)		25X1
3. Consolidate under SAC, (fly 10)		
4. Consolidate under CIA (fly 10)		
5. Consolidate under SAC (fly 7)		
6. Consolidate under CIA (fly 7)		

Thus, if one is willing to accept a lower mission capability, it is possible to reduce the number of aircraft and combine the fleets under one operator. Comparing the various combination-reductions shows that whatever the total number of aircraft deemed necessary to preserve the ready availability of U-2 performance advantages, the cost associated with maintaining the special characteristics derived from CIA management is per year.

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In summary then the specific questions that need to be addressed are these:

1. What is the likelihood that the IDEALIST U-2's will be used for contingency reconnaissance, overflight or periferal, in the foreseeable future?

2. Is this probability of use sufficiently high to justify the cost of that is required to keep the IDEALIST capabilities available?

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5. If the answer to either the second or the third question is affirmative, is it essential for the CIA to continue this program or could SAC plan to maintain the [redacted] contingency readiness capability [redacted]